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The purpose of this research is to find out whether some element of good corporate governance can affect 
the occurrence of earnings management with audit quality as a moderating variable in manufacturing 
companies listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange during 2017-2019. The independent variables include 
institutional ownership, independent board of commissioner, and audit committee with audit quality as a 
moderating variable. The dependent variable is earnings management which is measured by discretionary 
accrual with Modified Jones Model. The population of this research is 193 samples from companies listed 
at Indonesian Stock Exchange during 2017-2019. The sampling method used in this research is purposive 
sampling method. In addition, the data analysis method used is descriptive statistics, classical assumption 
test, multiple regression analysis, and sub-group moderated regression analysis. The result of this research 
indicates that the good corporate governance, which is represented by independent board of commissioner 
and audit committee have a negative effect while institutional ownership has effect on earnings 
management. Audit Quality strengthens the influence of independent board of commissioner on earnings 
management. However, audit quality cannot strengthen the influence of institutional ownership and audit 
committee on earnings management. 
 
Keyword: Institutional ownership, independent board of commissioner, audit committee, audit quality, 
and earnings management. 
1. Introduction 
 
The last result of the accounting process is a financial statement, a very important source of 
information in decision making for the users, both internal and external parties. Financial 
statements are arranged based on accounting standards finance and the principles it has set within 
a conceptual framework preparation of financial statements, with a purpose for the report to be 
truly reliable and able to influence the users in decision making. Arranging financial reports 
involving management, the board of commissioners, and shareholders for the process. Earnings 
management known as financial statements misused by management will affect the profit shown 
(Widyaningsih, 2017). Financial statements can be manipulated by inflating reported revenue as 
the common objective. To inflate revenue, firms can either commit fraud or manage earnings. 
Firms that have managed earnings, constrained in their ability to manage earnings (Perols & 





Lougee, 2011). Managers start and develop a practice called earnings management, a chance that 
arises, born of opposing needs and relationships that cross among the different partners of the 
company. Managers have multiple reasons to manipulate results explained by a literature review 
(Jiang et al., 2020).  
 
Good corporate governance is supposed to reduce fraud implemented by company managers and 
by the company owner, which can improve and generate trust from various parties to the 
company's performance as represented by the Financial Statements Company (Onasis, 2017). 
The corporate governance structure ensures the distribution of rights and responsibilities among 
the different parties in the organization and informs the decision-making rules and procedures 
which are institutional ownership, independent board of commissioner, audit committee as the 
independent variable in my research, and audit quality as moderating variable.   
2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
2.1. Agency Theory 
 
According to Jensen & Meckling (1976:308), one or more people (principal) involving other 
people (the agent) who make a contract to carry out some services on their behalf which take part 
delegating some decision-making authority to the agent is the definition of an agency 
relationship. Agency problems arise when inside the work of the business enterprise there are 
conflicts of interest. Agents and principals (managers and shareholders) or among the principals 
such as shareholders and debtholders can make conflicts (Band, 1992). 
 
2.2. Earnings Management 
 
Earnings management is an attitude or decision of company managers to increase or decrease the 
level of profit on the company's financial statements. Managers make efforts, namely earnings 
management in reporting company performance to trick users, especially internal parties, or as a 
planned time for recognition of revenues, expenses, profits, and losses to reduce profit 
fluctuations. (Damanik, 2020). Company insiders keep their post and get more advantage by 
manipulating the financial information given to outsiders called earnings management. Usually, 
this happens in the form of income manipulation and income smoothing (Wang & Campbell, 
2012). 
 
2.3. Good Corporate Governance 
 
According to the Cadbury Committee (1992), companies are directed and controlled by the 
system of corporate governance, also it defines as a set of regulation that explains the 
relationship among managers, creditors, shareholders, the government, employees, and internal 
and external stakeholders in honor to their rights and responsibilities. The system that regulates 
and controls the company to achieve balance is good corporate governance (Praptapa, 2009). 
 
2.4.  Audit Quality 
 
Auditing serves as a tool that can be used to reduce uncertainty in the presentation of financial 





information. Auditing is also a process used to bring down the inconsistency among principals 
and agents by employing external parties to authorize financial statements. So that audit quality 
results can be used and help external parties to detect earnings management practices (Lidiawati 
and Asyik, 2016). 
 
2.5. The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Earnings Management 
 
According to Jensen & Meckling (1976), institutional ownership has an important role in 
minimizing agency conflicts that occur between managers. High institutional ownership can 
influence and minimize the occurrence of earnings management practices because it is able to 
oversee management actions in the presentation of financial statements. 
 
The successful research that can show Institutional Ownership has a negative effect on earnings 
management are research results by Ajay and Madhumathi (2015), Sudiyanto (2016), Onasis 
(2017).  
H1: Institutional Ownership has a negative effect on Earnings Management. 
 
2.6. The Effect of Independent Board of Commissioner on Earnings Management 
 
A board consisting of a larger independent board of commissioners has strong control over 
management decisions and it is the best position to carry out the monitoring function to create a 
company with good corporate governance so it can influence the possibility of deviations by 
managers (Suri & Dewi, 2018). 
 
The successful research that can show independent board of commissioner has a negative effect 
on earnings management is research results by Syahreza et al. (2016), and Fatmawati (2018).  
H2: Independent Board of Commissioners has a negative effect on Earnings Management. 
 
2.7. The Effect of Audit Committee on Earnings Management 
 
The greater the number of audit committees within the company can increase the supervisory 
functions so that the quality of reporting carried out by management is guaranteed and it can 
minimize the actions of the management in doing earnings management practices (Lidiawati & 
Asyik, 2016). The successful research that can show audit committee has a negative effect on 
earnings management is research results by Yendrawati (2015),and Lidiawati & Asyik (2016).  
H3: Audit Committee has a negative effect on Earnings Management. 
 
2.8. Audit Quality as a Moderating Effect on Institutional Ownership on Earnings Management 
 
The size of the public accounting firm will greatly affect the independence and ability to 
detecting earnings management made by the company, so the big four public accounting firm 
can be said to be more capable of detecting earnings management than the non-big four public 
accounting firm (Hasty & Herawaty, 2017). 
H4: Audit Quality strengthens the Influence of Institutional Ownership on Earnings 
Management. 
 





2.9. Audit Quality as a Moderating Effect on Independent Board of Commissioner on Earnings 
Management 
 
If a company increases the number of independent boards of commissioners and were added by 
using the big four public accounting firm, the potential for earnings management in the company 
can greatly reduce. This research in line with (Boedhi & Ratnaningsih, 2015), that audit quality 
affects earnings management. 
H5: Audit Quality strengthens the Influence of the Independent Board of Commissioner on 
Earnings Management. 
 
2.10. Audit Quality as a Moderating Effect on Audit Committee on Earnings Management 
 
An auditor is a person who is entrusted with assessing, examining, or auditing the financial 
statements of an entity by following established procedures in professional standards. The 
quality of an auditor will determine the quality of the inspection carried out. Especially with the 
financial scandals that had occurred lately (Damanik, 2020). This research in line with Boedhi & 
Ratnaningsih (2015), that audit quality affects earnings management. 
H6: Audit Quality strengthens the Influence of Audit Committee on Earnings 
Management. 
2.11. Research Model 
 











2.12. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 Research Type 
This research was conduct quantitative research with a correlational approach to finding 
out whether some element of good corporate governance can affect the occurrence of 
earnings management with audit quality as a moderating variable. 
 
 Research Object 
The object of this research was the earnings management in the manufacturing 
companies, institutional ownership, independent board of commissioner, and audit 
committee with audit quality as a moderating variable. 
 
 Population and Sample 
The population in this study were manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesian 
Stock Exchange (IDX) for the 2017 -2019 period. There are 193 manufacturing 
Institutional Ownership (X1) 
Independent Board of 
Commissioner (X2) 
Audit Committee (X3) 
Audit Quality 
Earnings Management (Y) 





companies listed on the IDX, and only 38 manufacturing companies that are publish 
successive financial reports over research period. 
The research sample was taken with the purposive sampling method. From 38 
manufacturing companies listed on the IDX. There are 14 companies do not contain the 
required data and 8 outliers. So that only 16 companies can be processed. 
 Types and Data Sources 
Research data was in the form of secondary data sourced from manufacturing finance 
reports and annual reports for 2017-2019 compiled from the IDX website and Fact Book 
with documentation techniques. 
2.13. OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS OF RESEARCH VARIABLES 
 
 Dependent Variable (Y) 
Earnings management is a decision to choose which course of action taken by managers 
to influence profits and to achieve some specific goals of reported earnings (Scott, 2009). 
Measurement of earnings management using The Modified Jones Model formula 
(Dechow et al., 2015). Discretionary accrual is an accrual component that has 




 Independent Variable (X) 
The independent variables in this study are institutional ownership, independent board of 
commissioner, and audit committee. 
 Institutional Ownership 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), institutional ownership has an important role 
in minimizing agency conflicts that occur between managers and shareholders. 
Institutional ownership is a factor from external parties that participate in investing and 
can detect earnings management. Institutional ownership can be seen from the total 





 Independent Board of Commissioner 
Independent commissioners have the main responsibility to encourage the 
implementation of the principles of good corporate governance. The existence of 
independent commissioners in the company serves as a counterweight in the retrieval 
process use decision to protect minority shareholders and other parties related to the 
company (Widyaningsih, 2017). Indicators for measuring independent board of 
commissioner adopted from (Riadiani & Agus Wahyudin, 2015), calculated from the 
percentage of the number of independent commissioners from outside the company 




𝐃𝐀𝐂𝐂ᵢₜ  𝐓𝐀𝐂𝐂ᵢₜ/𝐀ᵢₜ − 𝐍𝐃𝐀𝐂𝐂ᵢₜ 
Number of institutional 
shares 
= 
Number of shares ownedby institution 
Number of outstanding shares 
X 100% 
 
The number of 




The number of the independent board of 
commissioners 
The total number of commissioners from the company 
X 100% 
 








 Audit Committee 
The Audit Committee is a body or committee formed by the board of commissioners to 
assist in conducting checks, examinations, and research. In principle, the main task of the 
audit committee is to assist the board of commissioners in performing the supervisory 
function of company performance (Lidiawati & Asyik, 2016). This study measured the 




2.14. Moderating Variable 
 
 Audit Quality 
Audit quality and the auditor are very important because as a form of assessment of the 
professional results of an auditor. Especially, in detecting, analyze, and report results to 
audit findings on client financial statements (Wiryadi and Sebrina, 2013). Audit quality is 
explained in dummy variables based on the external public accounting firm used by the 
company. Company those audited by big four public accounting firm have high quality 
(1), while non-big four public accounting firm have a low quality (0). The big four public 
accounting firms are Deloitte, Ernst and Young, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(Hasty & Herawaty, 2017). 
 
2.15. DATA ANALYSIS METHOD 
 
The data analysis method in this study was carried out with descriptive statistics, classical 
assumption test (normality test, multicollinearity test, heteroscedasticity test, autocorrelation 
test), multiple regression analysis, and sub-group moderated regression analysis. Data processing 
is done by SPSS 25. 
3. RESULTS  
Table 2. Purposive Sampling Procedure. 
Source: The result of the author 
No. Description Population 
1. A manufacturing company listed on the IDX  193 
2. A manufacturing company listed on the IDX 
2017-2019 period and publish successive 
financial reports over research period 
38 
2. The company does not fulfill the 
completeness data needed during the 2017-
2019 
(14) 
3. Outliers (8) 
Research data 





Audit Committee = the total number of the audit committee 





   
   
3.1. Data Analysis 
 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Research Variables. 
Source: Data processed use SPSS 25 
Research Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Institutional Ownership (X1) 48 0.0508 0.9250 0.6982 0.2342 
Independent Board of 
Commissioner (X2) 
48 0.3333 0.6000 0.4052 0.0811 
Audit Committee (X3) 48 2.0000 4.0000 2.8333 0.6631 
Audit Quality (Z) 48 0.0000 1.0000 0.6250 0.4892 
Earnings Management (Y) 48 -0.0115 0.0090 -0.0017 0.0039 
 
Based on data in Table 3 above, it can be explained as follows: 
N indicates the number of valid data for each variable is 48 data, while the number of 
missing data is zero, it means that all of research data are ready to process uses regression 
analysis. Audit committee variable has the highest value of  minimum, maximum, mean 
and standard deviation data. Meanwhile,  earnings management variable has the lowest 
value of minimum, maximum, mean, and standard deviation data.  
 
3.2. Classical Assumption Test 
 Normality Test 
Table 4. Normality Test Result. 








1 Standardized Residual 1.160 0.136 Normal 
 
From data in Table 4, it known that the asymptotic significant value of 0.136 is greater 
than 0.05. Therefore, the data of regression model within study is revealed a normal 
distribution. 
 Multicollinearity Test 
Table 5. Multicollinearity Test Result. 
Source: Data processed use SPSS 25 




1 Institutional ownership (X1)   0.938 1.066 No multicollinearity 
2 Independent board of 
commissioner (X2) 
  0.863 1.159 No multicollinearity 
3 Audit committee (X3)   0.837 1.195 No multicollinearity 
 
The tolerance value of all variables is greater than 0.1 and, also VIF value of institutional 
ownership, independent board of commissioner as well as the VIF value of audit 





committee variable each is less than 10. Hence, it can be stated that there is no 
multicollinearity in regression model. 
 
 Heteroscedasticity Test 
 
Table 6. Heteroscedasticity Test Result. 
Source: Data processed use SPSS 25 
No Variables Sig. Value  Judgment 
1 Institutional ownership (X1) 0.875 No heteroscedasticity 
2 Independent board of 
commissioner (X2) 
0.348 No heteroscedasticity 
3 Audit committee (X3) 0.822 No heteroscedasticity 
 
Refers to the result summary of heteroscedasticity test, it is obtained that significance value 
of institutional ownership, independent board of commissioner as well as the significance 
value of audit committee variable each is more than α (0.05). Hence, it can be stated that 
there is no heteroscedasticity in regression model. 
 
 Autocorrelation Test 
Table 7. Result Summary of Autocorrelation Test. 
No DWstatistic 
Value of  
dU 
Value of  
4 - dU 
Judgment 
1 1.983 1.671 2.329 No autocorrelation 
 
Based on data in Table 7, it shows that value of DWstatistic is 1.983. This value of DWstatistic 
is compared with value of DWtable uses amount of research data (n) is 48; and total of 
independent variables (k) of 3; thus, it can be determined the value of dU = 1.671. Because 
value of DWstatistic is between dU (1.671) and 4 - dU (2.329), so it can be stated there is no 
autocorrelation in the regression model within study. 
 Multiple Regression Analysis 
 
Table 8. Result Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis. 
Source: Source: Data processed use SPSS 25 






1. Institutional Ownership (X1) -0.0004 -0.200 > -1.680 
2. 
Independent Board of 
Commissioner (X2) 
-0.0157 -2.373 < -1.680 
3. Audit Committee (X3) -0.0033 -4.064 < -1.680 
Constant                                  =   0.0145 
Coefficient of Determination              =     0.288 
Fstatistic                                     =     5.941 
 
3.3. Goodness of Fit 
 
 Coefficient Determination 
Result summary of first multiple regression analysis in Table 8 shows that coefficient of 





determination (R square) is 0.288. It means that earnings management of manufacturing 
companies listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange year of 2017-2019 can be explained by 
institutional ownership, independent board of commissioner and audit committee variables 
of 28.80 percent, while the remaining of 71.20 percent can be explained by the other 
variables are not examined within study. 
 F-test 
Based on the confidence level of 95% or the significant level () = 0.05 with degree of 
freedom (df) = (k-1) = (4-1) = 3; and (n-k) = (48-4) = 44, it known that the Ftable value of 
2.84 (Appendix 16). From multiple regression analysis result, it is obtained the Fstatistic 
value of 5.941 is greater than Ftable value (2.84). Therefore, it can be explained that 
institutional ownership, independent board of commissioner and audit committee variables 
have the simultaneously effect on earnings management, or it can be stated that multiple 
regression model within study is fit with the research data (goodness of fit). 
 Significance Partially Effect Testing by T-test 
To test the significance partially effect of institutional ownership, independent board of 
commissioner as well as audit committee on earnings management within study uses t-test 
result. Based on the confidence level of 95% (α = 0.05) and degree of freedom (df) = (n-k) 
= (48-4) = 44 with one tailed t-test, it known that the ttable value of 1.680 (Appendix 17). 
From the result summary of multiple regression analysis in Table 9 above, it known that 
tstatistic value of institutional ownership variable (X1) is -0.200, tstatistic value of independent 
board of commissioner variable (X2) of -2.373 and tstatistic value of audit committee variable 
(X3) is -4.064. T-test curve of multiple regression analysis can be described is as follows: 









 Sub-Group Moderated Regression Analysis 
 First Sub-Group Moderated Regression Analysis and Chow Test 
To test fourth hypothesis which state that audit quality strengthens the influence of 
institutional ownership on earnings management, it is used Chow-test based on first 
sub-group moderated regression analysis results. 
 
Table 9. Result Summary of First Sub-Group Moderated Regression Analysis and Chow Test. 
Source: Data processed use SPSS 25 
No Measurers Results Fchow Ftable Judment 




2 RSSr1 (Big Four Group) 0.000332 
3 RSSr2 (Non Big Four  
Group) 
0.000376 






-ttable = -1.680 
 
Rejection Area  
of H0 
 
   tX3 = -4.064 
 
   tX2 = -2.373 
 
   tX1 = -0.200 
 






Based on the output of first sub-group moderated regression analysis in Table 9 
above, it can be seen Restricted Residual Sum of Squares of overall group (RSSr) is 
0.000718, Restricted Residual Sum of Squares of big four group (RSSr1) of 
0.000332, and Restricted Residual Sum of Squares of non-big four group (RSSr2) is 
0.000376.  Based on these value and result calculation of first Chow-test in Appendix 
12, it known that value of Fchow (0.649) is less than Ftable value with degree of 
freedom (df) = (k) = 1; and (n1 + n2 – 2) = (30 + 18 - 2) = 46 is 4.08. 
 Second Sub-Group Moderated Regression Analysis and Chow Test 
To test fifth hypothesis which state that audit quality strengthens the influence of 
independent board of commissioner on earnings management, it is used Chow-test 
based on second sub-group moderated regression analysis results. 
 
Table 10. Result Summary of Second Sub-Group Moderated Regression Analysis and Chow Test. 
Source: Data processed use SPSS 25 
No Measurers Results Fchow Ftable Judment 
1 RSSr (Overall Group) 0.000709 
5.686 4.08 Strengthen 
2 RSSr1 (Big four Group) 0.000308 
3 RSSr2 (Non big four  Group) 0.000323 
4 RSSur (RSSr1 + RSSr2) 0.000631 
 
Data in Table 10 shows that Restricted Residual Sum of Squares of overall group 
(RSSr) is 0.000709, Restricted Residual Sum of Squares of big four group (RSSr1) 
of 0.000308, and Restricted Residual Sum of Squares of non-big four group (RSSr2) 
is 0.000323. Based on these value and result calculation of second Chow-test in 
Appendix 12, it known that value of Fchow (5.686) is greater than Ftable value (4.08). 
 Third Sub-Group Moderated Regression Analysis 
To test sixth hypothesis which state that audit quality strengthens the influence of 
audit committee on earnings management, it is used Chow-test based on third sub-
group moderated regression analysis results. 
 
Table 11. Result Summary of Third Sub-Group Moderated Regression Analysis and Chow Test. 
Source: Data processed use SPSS 25 
No Measurers Results Fchow Ftable Judment 
1 RSSr (Overall Group) 0.000580 
1.388 4.08 Not Strengthen 
2 RSSr1 (Big Four Group) 0.000217 
3 RSSr2 (Non Big Four  Group) 0.000346 
4 RSSur (RSSr1 + RSSr2) 0.000563 
 
Based on the output of third sub-group moderated regression analysis in Table 11 
above, it can be seen Restricted Residual Sum of Squares of overall group (RSSr) is 
0.000580, Restricted Residual Sum of Squares of big four group (RSSr1) of 
0.000217, and Restricted Residual Sum of Squares of non-big four group (RSSr2) is 
0.000346.  Based on these value and result calculation of third Chow-test in 
Appendix 12, it known that value of Fchow (1.388) is less than Ftable value with degree 
of freedom (df) = (k) = 1; and (n1 + n2 – 2) = (30 + 18 - 2) = 46 is 4.08. 






3.4. Hypothesis Testing  
 First Hypothesis  
Based on the result summary of multiple regression analysis in Table 8, it has got the tstatistic 
value of institutional ownership variable (-0.200) is greater than -ttable value (-1.680). Thus, 
Ho is accepted while Ha is rejected, so it can be seen institutional ownership has a negative 
but no significant effect on earnings management. Therefore, first hypothesis within study 
which states that institutional ownership has a negative effect on earnings management is 
rejected. 
Second Hypothesis  
 
Refers to the result of multiple regression analysis, it has got the tstatistic value of 
independent board of commissioner variable (-2.373) is less than value of -ttable (-1.680). 
Thus, Ho is rejected while Ha is accepted, so it can be seen independent board of 
commissioner has a negative and significant effect on earnings management. Therefore, 
second hypothesis which states that independent board of commissioner has a negative 
effect on earnings management is accepted. 
 Third Hypothesis  
The result of multiple regression analysis in Table 8, it known that tstatistic value of audit 
committee variable (-4.064) is also less than value of -ttable (-1.680). Thus, Ho is rejected 
while Ha is accepted, it known that audit committee has a negative and significant effect 
on earnings management. Therefore, third hypothesis which states that audit committee has 
a negative effect on earnings management is accepted. 
 Fourth Hypothesis  
Based on Chow-test calculation result of first sub-group moderated regression analysis in 
Table 9, it known that value of Fchow (0.649) is less than Ftable value (4.08). Therefore, 
fourth hypothesis which states that audit quality strengthens the influence of institutional 
ownership on earnings management is rejected. 
 Fifth Hypothesis  
 
Refers to Chow-test calculation result of second sub-group moderated regression analysis 
in Table 10, it known that value of (5.686) is greater than Ftable value (4.08). Therefore, fifth 
hypothesis which states that audit quality strengthens the influence of independent board of 
commissioner on earnings management is accepted. 
Sixth Hypothesis  
 
Following the chow-test calculation result of third sub-group moderated regression analysis in 
Table 11, it known that value of Fchow (1.388) is less than Ftable value (4.08). Therefore, sixth 
hypothesis which states that audit quality strengthens the influence of audit committee on 
earnings management is rejected.  
 
Table 12. The Result of Hypothesis Test. 
Source: The result of the author 
Hypothesis Hypothesis Test Test Result 
H₁ 
 
Institutional Ownership has effect on 
Earnings Manangement  
Rejected 
 







Independent Board of Commissioners has a 





Audit Committee has a negative effect on 





Audit Quality Cannot Strengthen the 






Audit Quality strengthens the Influence of 
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 Direct Effect of Institutional Ownership on Earnings Management 
Institutional ownership has effect on earnings management. This is because in general, 
the institution investors do not carry out its role effectively as sophisticated investors who 
can supervise or monitor the performance of management to limit management from take 
an action or policies that will have an impact on earnings management action. 
Institutional investors only run their role as transient investors (company temporary 
owners) which instead only focuses on profits that are short term. This causal relationship 
indicates the higher level of institutional ownership is not always followed by the lower 
level of earnings management of manufacturing companies listed on Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. Result within study is in line with the finding of prior studies conducted by 
Mangkusuryo (2017); Purnama (2017) as well as Banjarnahor and Yando (2018), 
concluded that institutional ownership (IO) has no significant effect on earnings 
management. 
 Direct Effect of Independent Board of Commissioner on Earnings Management 
Independent board of commissioner has a negative effect on earnings management. This 
evidence shows that the higher level of independent board of commissioner is always 
followed by the lower level of earnings management of manufacturing companies listed 
on Indonesia Stock Exchange year of 2017-2019. Previous studies concluded that 
companies with a higher percentage of independent board of commissioners will be able 
to reduce earnings management practices within the company. Which means earnings 
management will decrease as far as independent board of commissioners increase. This 
result was consistent with the finding of previous studies conducted by Syahreza et al. 
(2016) as well as Fatmawati (2018), who concluded that independent board of 
commissioner has a negative effect on earnings management. 
 Direct Effect of Audit Committee on Earnings Management 
Audit committee has a negative effect on earnings management. This causal relationship 
can be explained that the higher level of audit committee is always followed by the lower 
level of earnings management of manufacturing companies listed on Indonesia Stock 
Exchange year of 2017-2019. An audit committee with an expert background in finance 
is an effective party to reduce earnings management. This is because the audit committee 





of financial experts really experienced in analyzing problems in financial statements, 
especially detecting fraud such as earnings management (Syahreza et al., 2016). 
 Moderating Effect of Audit Quality in the Influence of Institutional Ownership on 
Earnings Management  
Audit quality cannot strengthen the influence of institutional ownership on earnings 
management of manufacturing companies listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange. This 
result indicates that manufacturing companies which were audited by big four public 
accounting firm has not been able to strengthen the influence of institutional ownership 
on earnings management.  
 Moderating Effect of Audit Quality in the Influence of Independent Board of 
Commissioner on Earnings Management  
Audit quality strengthen the influence of independent board of commissioner on earnings 
management of manufacturing companies listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange. This 
result indicates that manufacturing companies which were audited by big four public 
accounting firm has able to strengthen the influence of independent board of 
commissioner on earnings management. It proven by the value of Fchow was greater than 
Ftable value.  
 Moderating Effect of Audit Quality in the Influence of Audit Committee on 
Earnings Management  
Audit quality cannot strengthen the Influence of audit committee on earnings 
management of manufacturing companies listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange. This 
result indicated that manufacturing companies which were audited by big four public 




The conclusions obtained from the result of this study indicate that institutional ownership has 
effect on earnings management while independent board of commissioner and audit committee 
have a negative effect on earnings management. Audit quality strengthens the influence of 
independent board of commissioner on earnings management. However, audit quality cannot 





Institutional ownership has effect on earnings management, this shows that institutional 
ownership which are the majority shareholders such as banks, insurance companies, asset 
management companies, investment companies, and ownership by other institutions will 
encourage increased of optimal control over management actions, so if the institutional feel 
dissatisfied with managerial performance, then they will liquidate their shares. This makes the 
management parties feels pressured because of optimally supervision from the institutional side, 
with this pressure management will try to make decisions carefully. Independent board of 
commissioners has a negative effect on earnings management, this proves that the commissioner 
can demonstrate independence in carrying out their duties, because it can guarantee the 
transparency and disclosure of the company's financial statements, seek fair treatment of 





minority shareholders and other stakeholders to make the supervisory function run well. Audit 
Committee has a negative effect on earnings management, this matter shows that the audit 
committee is one of the factors that can trigger earnings management actions because audit 
committee members have not carried their duties optimally. However, to reduce the occurrence 
of earnings management, companies are expected work as well as possible in accordance with 
applicable procedures such as, overseeing financial reports, overseeing external audits, and 
analizing in depth the management carried out by management. Audit Quality as moderating 
variable cannot strengthen the influence of institutional ownership and audit committee on 
earnings management. However, audit quality strengthens the influence of independent board of 
commissioner on earnings management, this proves that audit quality is one of the important 
aspects to detect earnings management, by choosing a good auditor such as by choosing the big 
four public accounting firm or choosing a competent auditor. A quality audit is an audit carried 
out by a competent person and an independent person. A competent auditor is an auditor who has 
technological capabilities, understands, carries out the correct audit procedures, and uses the 
correct sampling method. 
7. Research Limitation 
 Indicators in this study were limited to the independent variables, namely institutional 
ownership, independent board of commissioner, and audit committee with the moderating 
variable audit quality, while many other variables can affect the earnings management 
such as managerial ownership, company size, leverage and many more.  
 This study only used a sample of data for 3 years, namely 2017-2019 with the research 
object was the financial manufacturing companies.  
 This study only used 16 samples of companies in the financial sector. The total of 
manufacturing companies are 193 and the rest of it has been eliminated (Table 2). In the 
next study, it is hoped that it can expand the research sample and increase the number of 
variables used so that the research results will be more useful for various parties.






Ajay, R., & Madhumathi, R. (2015). Institutional ownership and earnings management in India. Indian 
Journal of Corporate Governance, 8(2), 119-136. 
Ajina, A., & Habib, A. (2017). Examining the relationship between Earning management and market 
liquidity. Research in International Business and Finance, 42, 1164-1172.  
Band, D. (1992). Corporate governance: Why agency theory is not enough. European Management Journal, 
10(4), 453–459. 
Banjarnahor, H., & Yando, A. D. (2018). Mekanisme good corporate governance terhadap manajemen laba 
dengan kinerja keuangan sebagai variable moderasi. Jurnal Ilmiah Akuntansi dan Finansial Indonesia, 
2(1), 29-40. 
Boedhi, N. R., & Ratnaningsih, D. (2015). Pengaruh Kualitas Audit Terhadap Manajemen Laba Melalui 
Aktivitas Riil. Kinerja, 19(1), 84-98. 




Cornett, M. M., McNutt, J. J., & Tehranian, H. (2009). Corporate governance and earnings management at 
large U.S. bank holding companies. Journal of Corporate Finance, 15(4), 412–430. 
Chen, Haiwei & Jory, Surendranath & Ngo, Thanh, 2020. Earnings management under different ownership 
and corporate governance structure: A natural experiment with master limited partnerships. The Quarterly 
Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 139-156. 
Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., Sweeney, A. P., Sloan, R. G., & Sweeney, A. P. (2015). Detecting Earnings 
Management. Asian Financial Statement Analysis, 70(2), 73–105. 
DeAngelo, L. E. (1981). Auditor size and audit quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 3(3), 183–
199. 
Damanik, H. (2020). Pengaruh Good Corporate Governance dan Kualitas Auditor Terhadap Manajemen 
Laba dengan Profitabilitas sebagai Variabel Moderating pada Perusahaan Manufaktur Sub Sektor Logam 
yang Terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia. 10, 15–27 
Fatmawati, Y. (2018). Pengaruh mekanisme good corporate governance terhadap manajemen laba (studi 
empiris pada perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia Tahun 2011-2015). 
JurnalAkuntansi, 6(1). 
Gani, I., & Amalia, S. (2015). Alat Analisis Data: Aplikasi Statistik untuk Penelituan Bidang Ekonomi dan 
Sosial. Penerbit Andi. 
Ghozali, Imam. (2018). Aplikasi Analisis Multivariate Dengan Program IBM SPSS 25. Semarang: Badan 
Penerbit Universitas Diponegoro. 





Hasty, A. D., & Herawaty, V. (2017). Pengaruh Struktur Kepemilikan, Leverage, Profitabilitas dan 
Kebijakan Dividen terhadap Manajemen Laba dengan Kualitas Audit sebagai Variabel Moderasi. Media 
Riset Akuntansi, Auditing & Informasi, 17(1), 1-16. 
Jiang, F., Ma, Y., & Wang, X. (2020). Multiple blockholders and earnings management. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 64(June), 101689. 
Jihene, F., & Moez, D. (2019). The Moderating Effect of Audit Quality on CEO Compensation and Tax 
Avoidance: Evidence from Tunisian Context. International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, 
9(1), 131. 
Jensen, C., & Meckling, H. (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership 
structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360. 
Kouaib, A., & Almulhim, A. (2019). Earnings manipulations and board‘s diversity: The moderating role of 
audit. Journal of High Technology Management Research, 30(2), 100356. 
Komite Nasional Kebijakan Governance. (2006). Pedoman umum Good Corporate Governance Indonesia. 
Jakarta: KNKG. 
Kompas.com, 15 January 2020. Which was accessed on October 20, 2020. 
https://money.kompas.com/read/2020/01/15/160600526/jejak-hitam-pt-hanson-international-manipulasi-
laporan-keuangan-2016?page=all 
Libby, R., Rennekamp, K. M., & Seybert, N. (2015). Regulation and the interdependent roles of managers, 
auditors, and directors in earnings management and accounting choice. Accounting Organizations and 
Society, 47, 25-42. 
Lidiawati, N., & Asyik, N. F. (2016). Pengaruh Kualitas Audit, Komite Audit, Kepemilikan Institusional, 
Ukuran Perusahaan Terhadap Manajemen Laba. Jurnal Ilmu dan Riset Akuntansi (JIRA), 5(5). 
Lipton, M., & Lorsch, J. W. (1992). A modest proposal for improved corporate governance. The business 
lawyer, 59-77. 
Lozano, M. B., Martínez, B., & Pindado, J. (2016). Corporate governance, ownership, and firm value: 
Drivers of ownership as a good corporate governance mechanism. International Business Review, 25(6), 
1333–1343. 
Liputan6.com, 22 July 2015. Which was accessed on October 20, 2020. 
https://www.liputan6.com/bisnis/read/2277114/skandal-terungkap-ceo-toshiba-mundur 
Mangkusuryo, Y., & Jati, A. W. (2017). Pengaruh Mekanisme Good Corporate Governance Terhadap 
Manajemen Laba. Jurnal Reviu Akuntansi dan Keuangan, 7(2), 1067-1080. 
Myers, R. H., & Myers, R. H. (1990). Classical and modern regression with applications (Vol. 2, p. 488). 
Belmont, CA: Duxbury press. 
Nagar, N., & Sen, K. (2016). Earnings management in India: Managers‘ fixation on operating profits. In 
Journal of International Accounting, Auditing, and Taxation (Vol. 26). Elsevier Inc. 
Naftalia, V. C., & Marsono, M. (2013). Pengaruh Leverage Terhadap Manajemen Laba Dengan Corporate 





Governance Sebagai Variabel Pemoderasi (Doctoral dissertation, Fakultas Ekonomika dan Bisnis). 
Onasis, D. (2017). Pengaruh Good Corporate Governance terhadap Manajemen Laba Perusahaan Industri 
Manufaktur Basic Industri yang Terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia. Jurnal Ilmu Komputer dan Bisnis, 
8(1), 1847-1856. 
Praptapa, A. (2009). Strategi Mengendalikan Organisasi. The Art of Controlling People, 1-154. 
Purnama, D. (2017). Pengaruh Profitabilitas, Leverage, Ukuran Perusahaan, Kepemilikan Institusional dan 
Kepemilikan Manajerial Terhadap Manajemen Laba. Jurnal Riset Keuangan Dan Akuntansi, 3(1). 
Perols, J. L., & Lougee, B. A. (2011). The relation between earnings management and financial statement 
fraud. Advances in Accounting, 27(1), 39-53. 
Richardson, V.J. (2000). Information Asymmetry and Earnings Management: Some Evidence. Review of 
Quantitative Finance and Accounting 15, 325–347. 
Riadiani, A. R., & Wahyudin, A. (2015). Pengaruh Good Corporate Governance Terhadap Manajemen Laba 
Dengan Financial Distress Sebagai Intervening. Accounting Analysis Journal, 4(3). 
Suliyanto. (2018). Metode Penelitian Bisnis: untuk Skripsi, Tesis & Disertasi. Yogyakarta. ANDI 
Sugiyono. (2017). Metode Penelitian Kuantitatif, Kualitatif, dan R&D. Bandung: Alfabeta, CV. 
Syahreza, F., Pratomo, D., & Yudowati, S. (2016). Pengaruh Komisaris Independen Dan Komite Audit 
Terhadap Manajemen Laba (Studi Empiris Pada Perusahaan Manufakur Sub Sektor Makanan dan 
Minuman yang Terdaftar di dalam Bursa Efek Indonesia Tahun 2010-2013). E-Proceeding of 
Management, 3(2), 1552-1559. 
Suri, N., & Dewi, I. P. (2018). Pengaruh Mekanisme Good Corporate Governance Terhadap Manajemen 
Laba (Studi pada Perusahaan Manufaktur Sektor Food and Beverages yang Terdaftar di Bursa Efek 
Indonesia periode 2012–2016). Jurnal Sains Manajemen & Akuntansi Volume X No. 
Syofyan, A., & Herawaty, V. (2019). Pengaruh Good Corporate Governance Terhadap Financial Distress 
dengan Kualitas Audit sebagai Pemoderasinya. Prosiding Seminar Nasional Cendekiawan, (pp. 2-38). 
Sudiyanto, Y., & Husaini, H. (2016). Pengaruh Kepemilikan Institusional, Kepemilikan Manajerial dan 
Leverage Terhadap Manajemen Laba dan Konsekuensinya Terhadap Nilai Perusahaan (Studi pada 
Perusahaan yang Melakukan Right Issue di Bursa Efek Indonesia Periode 2009-2013) (Doctoral 
dissertation, Universitas Bengkulu). 
Scott, W. R. (2009). Financial Accounting Theory Fifth Edition. Toronto: Pearson Prentice Hall. 
Sutino, E. R. D., & Khoiruddin, M. (2016). Pengaruh Good Corporate Governance Terhadap Manajemen 
Laba pada Perusahaan yang masuk dalam JII (Jakarta Islamic Index) tahun 2012-2013. Management 
Analysis Journal, 5(3). 
Ujiyantho, M. A., & Agus Pramuka, B. (2007). Mekanisme Corporate Governance, Manajemen Laba dan 
Kinerja Keuangan (studi pada perusahaan go publik sektor manufaktur). Simposium Nasional Akuntansi 
X, Juli, 1–26. 





Wang, Y., & Campbell, M. (2012). Corporate governance, earnings management, and IFRS: Empirical 
evidence from Chinese domestically listed companies. Advances in Accounting, 28(1), 189–192. 
Watts, R. L., & Zimmerman, J. (1978). 1978_Watts and Zimmerman.pdf. The Accounting Review: Vol. LIII 
(Issue 1, pp. 112–134). 
Wiryadi, A., & Sebrina, N. (2013). Pengaruh Asimetri Informasi, Kualitas Audit, dan Struktur Kepemilikan 
Terhadap Manajemen Laba. Wahana Riset Akuntansi, 1(2). 
Widyaningsih, H. (2017). Pengaruh Corporate Governance Terhadap Manajemen Laba. Nominal: Barometer 
Riset Akuntansi dan Manajemen, 6(2), 91-107. 
Yando, A. D. (2018). Pengaruh Asimetri Informasi terhadap Praktik Manajemen Laba. Jurnal Akuntansi 
Barelang, 3(1), 1-10. 
Yendrawati, R. (2015). Pengaruh Dewan Komisaris Independen, Komite Audit, Kepemilikan Manajerial, 
dan Kepemilikan Institusional Terhadap Manajemen Laba. Jurnal Entrepreneur dan Entrepreneurship, 
4(1, 2), 33-40
